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ABSTRACT
In a model that allows smooth substitution between domestic and imoorted
inputs, content protection distorts inout choice but does not force a divergence
between price and unit production cost. Content protection biases gains in
technical efficiency away from those saving domestic input and toward those
saving imported input. By increasing derived demand for the domestic input,
a marginally effective content requirement benefits suppliers of this input.
Increases in the content requirement above the marginally effective level
increase such benefits to suppliers of the domestic input provided that the
price elasticity of demand for the final product is less than a critical value.
The consequences of content protection are not materially affected by monopoly
in the domestic final product market or monopsony in the domestic input market
unless such monopoly or monopsony are created by content protection. The
situation of a monopolistic supplier of the domestic input is enhanced by
content protection.
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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes economic effects of policies of content protection,
such as the proposal to require automobiles sold in the United States to
embody a prescribed minimum share of domestic value added. Similar policies
have been implemented in a number of developing countries, as well as in
Australia and Canada. Included in this broad class of policies are both
requirements that final goods assembled in a country should use a minimum
amount of domestic input, and requirements that final goods exported to a
country should use a minimum amount of domestic input in their foreign
assembly processes.1
To analyze the consequences of such policies of content protection, it is
assumed that the final product is produced in accord with a neo—classical
production function, specified in section 2, that employs domestic inputs and
imported (or foreign) inputs. This specification allows for smooth substi-
tution possibilities between domestic and imported inputs which, it is argued,
characterize the situation of many industries that are the actual or potential
subjects of content protection policies. This specification differs from that
of Grossman (1981) who assumes that the imported material input is a perfect
substitute for a domestically produced material input and that total material
input (imported plus domestic) substitute against domestic labor in the
production of final output.2 Using the present specification, it is shown
that a domestic content requirement, specified as a required minimum share of
domestic input in the value of final product and enforced by a penalty tariff
imposed against violators, raises the ratio of domestic input to imported
input and creates a production distortion by raising unit production cost2
abovethe cost minimizing level. Because of the all—or--nothing nature of the
enforcement penalty, however, content protection has the virtue of not
inducinga distortion between the social cost of production (given the
distortion of input choice) and the price charged to consumers of the final
product. For this reason, content protection is preferable to a tariff on
imported inputs or a subsidy on domestic inputs as a policy to increase the
ratio of domestic to imported input in final output.
Content protection has less salutory effects when account is taken, in
section 3, of the effects on incentives for improvements in techincal effi-
ciency. The private and social benefit of technical improvements that save on
domestic input is artificially reduced and the private and social benefit of
technical improvements that save on imported inputs is artificially increased
by a domestic content requirement. Taking account of the cost of finding and
implementing improvements in technical efficiency, therefore, content pro-
tection will impede progress in making production processes that employ
domestic inputs more efficient, and will lead to excess investment in
technical improvements that reduced required amounts of imported inputs.
The effects of content protection on the equilibrium price and quantity
of the domestic input are obviously of central concern to the suppliers of
this input, who are frequently the most ardent advocates of contentprotec-
tion.In section 4, it is shown that under competitive market conditions, a
small increase in the domestic content requirement above the level that firms
would voluntarily choose will increase the derived demand for the domestic
input and (assuming a positive but less than infinite elasticity of supply of
the domestic input) will also increase the equilibrium quantity and price of
the domestic input. The direct effect of further increases in the domestic
content requirement above this marginally effective level are at least3
partially offset by reductions in demand for the final product resulting from
increases in its price due to increased unit cost that are the consequence of
content protection. However, provided that the price elasticity of demand for
the final product is less than a critical value, the overall effect of an
increase in the domestic content requirement will still be to increase the
derived demand for the domestic input and, hence, the equilibrium quantity and
price of that input.
The condition for an increase in the content requirement to increase
demand for the domestic input is modified in situations, examined in section
5, where only foreign firms (and not domestic firms) are effectively con-
strained by content protection. In such situations, the own price elasticity
of demand for the foreign firms' product is likely to be larger than the over-
all price elasticity of demand for the products of domestic and the foreign
firms because an increase in the price of the foreign firms' product shifts
demand toward the domestic firms' product. Hence, the increase in the price
of the foreign firms' product due to an increased domestic content requirement
will be a more powerful force in reducing demand for the domestic input.
However, since a shift of demand toward the domestic product increases domes-
tic firms' demands for the domestic input, the overall effect of an increase
in the content requirement for foreign firms is still likely to be an increase
in demand for the domestic input.
The implications of non—competitive behavior in the final product and
domestic factor markets are examined in section 6. Content protection does
not alter the usual difference between monopolistic and competitive behavior
by sellers of the final product or between rnonopsonistic and competitive
behavior by buyers of the domestic input, unless content protection creates a
monopoly or monopsony situation when one would not otherwise exist. Content4
protection, however, does interact in an interesting way with monopoly behav-
ior of suppliers of the domestic input since it alters the elasticity of
demand for this input in a way that can always be exploited by these
suppliers.
The main results of this analysis of content protection are summarized in
section 7, and extensions and modifications of these results are briefly
discussed.
2. Effects on Input Choice, Production Cost and C).itput Price
The technology of the industry subject to content protection is assumed
to be described by a neo—classical, linear homogeneous production function,
X =F(I,D)or X/I E x =f(d)F(l, d), with d E D/I (1)
where X is the quantity of final output, I is the quantity of imported (or
foreign) input, and D is the quantity of domestic input. This production
function applies equally well to a final product assembled at home using
domestic and imported inputs, and to a final product assembled abroad using
domestic and foreign inputs and then exported back to the homecountry. The
smooth shape of the isoquants of this production function illustrated in
figure 1 reflect the assumption that domestic input can be substituted contin-
uously, but with increasing difficulty, for imported (or foreign) input. The
idea is that as the required share of domestic content rises,production of
more components and more assembly processes must employ domestic inputs,
starting first with the production activities in which domestic inputs are
relatively most efficient and moving progressively to activities where these
inputs are less and less efficient in comparison with imported (orforeign)
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is a favorite subject of such requirements in developing countries and a
possible subject in the United States. .rguably, this description also
applies to a wide range of manufactured goods, from apparel to televisions,
that are or might become subjects of content protection.3
Xmestic nominal prices of final product, domestic input, and imported
input are denoted by P,U, and V1 respectively. Using the domestic input
as numeraire, relative prices of the final output and the imported input are
denoted by p =P/Uand v =V/U,respectively. The zero profit condition
for final goods producers requires that
P=aD.U+aI.V or paD+aIv . (2)
where aD =D/xis the amount of domestic input per unit of output and
a1 =I/Xis the amount of imported input per unit of output. Using the fact
that aD =d/f(d)and a1 =1/f(d),it follows that the relative output
price consistent with zero profits is given by
p =(d+ v)/f(d) (3)
The cost minimizing input ratio is determined by the requirement that the
marginal technical rate of substitution equal the relative input price;
=[f(d)—df'(d)]/f'(d)E 4(d) =v (4)
For example, if the input price ratio is v0, then as illustrated in figure
1, the cost minimizing input ratio is determined by the point 7 along
the iso—quant F(I, D) =1at which the marginal technical rate of substi-
tution is equal to v0. For any v, choice of d =1(v)clearly results
in the minimum relative output price, p(v) =[1(v)+ v]/f(1(v)), that is
consistent with zero profits for that input price ratio.7
Imestic content requirements may sometimes be set in terms of physical
units, but because of difficulties in comparing physical units of different
inputs and outputs, it is more common for a domestic content requirement to be
stated in terms of share of domestic inputs in the value of final output.
This share is given by
6=
aU/(aD+va1) = d/(d+v) . (5)
An effective domestic content requirement that sets a minimum value5* for
6implies that the input ratio must be
d*(6*, v) =(v6*)/(1—6*) , (6)
which is greater than the input ratio d =1(v)that would minimize




is greater than the price p[1(v) +v]/f(1(v))that yields zero
profits when producers minimize cost. For example, if the domestic content
requirement necessitates an input ratio d1 =d*(v0,3*) >= 1(v0),then
as illustrated in figure 1, production occurs at the point B along the unit
iso—quant, rather than at the cost minimizing point A. The relative output
price that yields zero profits with this content requirement p1 =p*(v0,
6*) =
(d1
+v0)/f(d1),is indicated by the vertical intercept of the line passing
through B with slope equal to —v0• This price is clearly greater than the
price P that yields zero profits under cost minimization, as indicated by
the vertical intercept of the tangent to the unit iso—quant (with slope equal
to -v0) at the cost minimizing production point A.8
¶I enforce an effective domestic content requirement, there must be an
incentive for compliance or a penalty for violation. When the final product
is produced at home with imported inputs, it is natural for this incentive or
penalty to be a tariff charged on imported inputs for producers violating the
content requirement but rebated to producers complying with the requirement.4
The penalty tariff necessary to enforce the content requirement must make the
minimumcost for violators at least as great as the cost for those who
comply.For example, in the situation illustrated in figure 1,an input
tariff which makes the relativeprice of imported inputs for violators
v1
=(1+ t1)v0 is sufficient toenforce the content requirement because the
isocostline for violators with intercept p1and slope v1 passes below the
unitisoquant. Producers who satisfy the content requirement, however, can
produce at B and enjoy unit costs of only P1. The content requirement and
the enforcement penalty make the isocost locus for unit cost of p1 corre-
spond to the kinked line thatconnects the points p1,B, E and G. With
this jsocost locus, the optimum productionpointisclearly B.
When the final good isproduced abroad withexported domestic inputs, it
is natural that the incentive for compliance be apenalty tariff (at an ad
valorem rate t) on imports of the final product that do not satisfy the
content requirement. Since1 + t imported units of final product subject to
thistariff generate the same revenue as one unit satisfying the content
requirement, producers will satisfy the requirement when the cost of pro-
ducing1 +tunits with a free choice of inputs is greater than the cost of
producing1 unit under the content requirement. In terms of figure 1, the
penaltytariff rate t1, for which the iso—quantF(I, D) =1+t1 lies
everywhereabove the iso—cost line connecting p1,B, E and G is suffi-
cient to enforce the content requirement.9
It is an important property of content protection that the output price
consistent with zero profits does not depend on the penalty used to enforce
the content requirement, so long as the penalty is high enough to induce
compliance. This property reflects the all—or—nothing nature of the penalty
imposed for any violation of the content requirement. If the requirement is
satisfied, no penalty at all must be paid and the zero profit price of a unit
of output embodies only unit production cost and no penalty. Unit production
cost, of course, exceeds the minimum achievable when producers are allowed
free choice of inputs, but a content requirement generates no additional
distortion by forcing a divergence between true social production cost (with
the distored choice of inputs) and the price producers must charge to earn
zero profit.5
This property of content protection schemes accounts for their superi-
ority over alternative policies for increasing the ratio of domestic input to
imported input. Another policy that could achieve this same objective, in the
case where the final output is produced at home using imported inputs, is an
ad valorem tariff on imported inputs, with no rebates for producers. Specif-
ically, to achieve the same input ratio d1 as the content protection policy
illustrated in figure 1, a tariff on the imported input would have to raise
the domestic relative price of this input to the level determined by the
slope of the unit iso—quant at the point B. Since this tariff is collected,
producers must charge a price p2, determined by the vertical intercept of the
tangent to the unit iso—quant at B, in order to earn zero profit. Since
p1 is the true social cost of producing a unit of output using the input
combination at B, the difference p2 —
p1measures an excess of price
charged to consumers over true social production cost and implies a consump-
tion distortion loss in excess of the distortion loss from content protection.610
Alternatively, the domestic input ratio could be raised to d1 by paying a
subsidy on the use of domestic inputs that raises the relative price of
imported inputs to v2. Since this subsidy reduces the output price for
consumers (at the expense of the government) to below true social production
cost, this subsidy creates consumption distortion loss in excess of the
distortion loss from content protection. Because a content requirement avoids
the excess consumption distortion loss generated by a tariff on imported
inputs or a subsidy on domestic inputs, it is the second best policy for
achieving a prescribed increase in the ratio of domestic input to imported
input. This question remains, of course, why society should tolerate the
production inefficiency that inevitably results from content protection in
order to raise the ratio of domestic to imported input.
3. Incentives for Improvements in Technical Efficiency
The conclusion concerning the second—best optimality of a content protec-
tion policy requires qualification in situations where firms incur costs to
maintain and improve the efficiency of their production processes. While
analysis of such situations is not fully compatible with assumptions of
perfect competition and a common constant-returns—to—scale technology for all
firms, we can use the model of the preceding section to indicate the distor-
tion of incentives for improvements in technical efficiency created by content
protection.'lb this end, consider the reduction in unit production cost
resulting from improvements in technical efficiency for a firm initially
operating under the content protection policy described by the point B in
figure 1, which corresponds to the points B in figures 2 and 3. An improve-
ment in technical efficiency that allows for a small reduction D <0in the
amount of domestic unit used to produce a unit of output shifts the unit iso—11
quant downward in figure 2 to the iso—quant passing through the point G. To
satisfy the domestic content requirement with the new technology, the firm
must move up the unit iso—quant to the point H that lies along the ray
where D/I =d1Substitution of domestic for imported inputs in the move
from G to I-!occurs at the rate v2 which is equal to the marginal
technical rate of substitution at G and at B. The reduction in unit pro-
duction cost made possible by the improvement in technical efficiency is
measured units of domestic input by p =p3
—
p1,where p1 and p3 are
the vertical intercepts of the lines passing through B and H, respectively,
with slopes equal to —v0 'lb the first order of approximation, the reduction








This result indicates the benefit to the firm and to society from an
improvement in technical efficiency that saves domestic input, given that the
content protection policy is in force. However, the benefit to society from
this improvement in technical efficiency in the absence of the content protec-
tion policy is greater than the amount indicated by (8) because saving one
unit of domestic input in the absence of this policy would be worth exactly
one unit of domestic input. Since (v2 —v0)/(v2
+d1)
must be less than 1,
the distortion created by content protection cannot eliminate all of the
benefit from improvements in technical efficiency that save domestic input.
But, if the difference between v2 and v0 is large, the distortion could
substantially reduce this benefit.
For improvements in technical efficiency that save imported input, the
disortion created by content protection works in the opposite direction. sD
12
Fig.—-2: The Effects of a Reduction in Domestic Input Necessary





illustrated in figure 3, saving a small amount I of imported input shifts
the unit iso—quant to the left to the new iso—quant passing through the
point J.Pit J, the firm can substitute increased imported input for
reduced domestic input (at a rate equal to the marginal technical rate of
substitution v2) and still satisfy the domestic content requirement by
producing at the point K. Th the first order of approximation, the reduction
in unit production cost resulting from this increase in technical efficiency
is
=
v0+ (v2 —v0)[d1/(v2+ d1)] . (9)
In this result, the amount v0 represents the social and private benefit of
saving a unit of imported input in the absence of content protection. The
additional amount (v2 -v0)[d1/(v2 + d1)1 > 0 is the distortionary effect
of content protection that arises because content protection forces a differ-
ential between the marginal value imported input in production (measured by
the marginal technical rate of substitution V2) and the pricev0 of this
input.
Content protection does not create any distortion for a neutral improve-.
ment in technical efficiency that saves domestic and imported inputs in the
same proportion as these inputs are initially used in producing a unit of
output. Under content protection, however, economic incentives operate
against neutral improvements in technical efficiency and in favor of improve-
ments that save on imported input rather than domestic input. Diminished
incentives for improvements in technical efficiency that save on domestic
inputs provide a serious argument against use of content protection to provide
temporary protection for infant industries or mature industries that need to
regain international competitiveness since achievement of world standards of
efficiency is likely to depend on efficiency in the use of domestic inputs.D
14
Fig.——3: The Effects of a Reduction in Imported Input Necessary





4. Price and Quantity of Etnestic Input
To assess these effects of content protectionon the equilibrium price
and quantity of the domestic input, assume that demandfor the final product
is a declining function, H(P), of its absoluteprice, with an elasticity of
demand n =(P/H)H'(P). The imported input is assumed to be ininfinitely
elastic supply at a given level of its absoluteprice,V. Supply of the
domestic input is assumed to be an increasingfunction, S(U), of its
absolute price, with an elasticity of supply C= (U/S)S'(U) When compe-
tition prevails in all markets, derived demand forthe domestic input is
determined by multiplying x =s(p)by D/X =aD=d/f(d).Using the fact
that P =U[(d+v)/f(d)J,it follows that
D =(d/f(d))•H[(rjj/f(d))+(V/f(d))J . (10)
Using a hat"todenote a proportionate change, the proportionate






As before,S =d/(d+v)is the share of domestic input in the cost of
producing a unit of output. y =(d/f(d))f'(d)is the elasticity of X/i =
f(d)with respect to d =D/I.
When content protection is not in force, theinput ratio d is the cost
minimizing input ratio d =1(v),where (d) =[f(d)—df'(d)J/f'(d).
Substituting (d) for v, it is easily shown that in the absenceof content16
protection, the share of domestic input,5 = d/(d +v),is equal to y;
= d/(d +v)= d/(d +(d))= df'(d)/f(d) = y, when v = +(d). (14)
Further, since in the absence of content protection d = it follows
that the proportionate change in the input ratio is given by
d = c(U —v) (15)
where a = (1 —1)[f'(d)/d'f"(d)] < 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between domestic and imported inputs. This result together with (11), (12),
and (13) implies that
D =[niS+(1—1)aJ u (16)
D= [(1 —tS)....(1 —y)'a]v• (17)
Equation (17) reveals the condition for a tariff on the imported input,
which induces a positive V, to increase demand for the domestic input: the
elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the imported input must be
greater in absolute value than the price elasticity of demand for the final
output. Otherwise, the negative effect on the derived demand for D from the
increase in the output price caused by the increased cost of the imported
input will outweigh the positive substitution effect of the increase in the
price of the imported input relative to the domestic input. It follows that
suppliers of the domestic input will benefit from a tariff imposed on the
imported input only when the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
imported inputs is greater (in absolute value) than the price elasticity of
demand for the final product.
Under content protection, the input ratio is no longer d = but
rather ci = d*(S*, v) = (vscS*)/(1 —S*)•With a fixed content requirement,17
therefore,
d=v=V—U . (18)
Further, the proportionate response of d to a proportionate change in the
content requirement is
=[1/(1-(5*)].(5*• (19)
These results together with (11), (12), and (13), determine the proportionate
response of demand for the domestic input to proportionate changes in U,
V, and (5*when content protection is in force:
D= [(5* -(1-') + n.(y-(5*)].tJ F•u (20)
D =[(1—5*).+(1—y)—rp(y — 5*)].V (21)
D = y+.((5* - y)]/(i-(5*)].* • (22)
In all of these results, the difference between y =df'(d)/f(d)and
5* is important. I measures the share of domestic input when the price of
imported input equals the marginal technical rate of substitution; whereas
(5*is the minimum required share of domestic input when imported input is
valued at its market price. Without a content requirement, I =5.When the
content requirement is more than marginally effective, however, the narginal
technical rate of substitution is greater than the market relative price of
the imported input and hence 5* is > y.
It follows that starting with a content requirement that is on the margin
of effectiveness, a small proportionate increase5* causes art equal propor-
tionate increase in demand for the domestic input;7 that is
D =[(1 — 1)/Cl—5*)].5*5* when 5* =(v)/(4i Cv) +v) (23)18
The reason for this equal proportionate effect is that with only a marginally
effective content requirement, a small increase in6* has only a second
order of small effect on unit cost and output price. The direct first order
effect of an increase in6* on demand for the domestic input, therefore, is
not offset by any first order indirect effect of a reduction in final output
demand due to an increase in the final output price.
When the content requirement is more than marginally effective, an
increase in 6* causes a first order increase in the final output price to
the extent of p =[(6*— — 6*)].6*This increase in P at least
partially offsets the direct effect on the demand for domestic input of the
increase in 5* When content protection is sufficiently stringent to produce
a large difference between 6* and 1, it is possible that further increases
in5* will reduce demand for the domestic input. For this not to happen,
the price elasticity of demand for the final product must not be too large;
specifically, for defined in (22) to be positive, it is necessary that
JnJ (1 —1)/(6*—1). (24)
Since 6* 1,it is clear that this condition is always satisfied ifI n <1.
The the equilibrium responses of D and U to changes in5* depend on
the elasticity of supply of the domestic input. Specifically, equating
D =E'tJ,toD =r•u+c.6*,it follows that the equilibrium responses of
U and D to a change in the content requirement are given by
u = - r)J..6* (25)
D =[c/(c-r)J.c2.5* (26)
Since Cis>0andr is <0, anincrease in 6* will increase both the
equilibrium price and the equilibrium quantity of the domestic input if and19
only if 2 is positive for which the necessary and sufficient condition is
given by (24).
In summary, when competition prevails in all markets, imposition of a
marginally effective content requirement always protects suppliers of the
domestic input by raising demand for this input thereby increasing its
equilibrium price and the quantity employed in the industry subject to the
content requirement. In contrast, a tariff imposed on the imported input
benefits suppliers of the domestic input only when the elasticity of substi-
tution between domestic and imported inputs is greater (in absolute value)
than the price elasticity of demand for the final product. Increases in the
required share of domestic content above the marginally effective level will
further increase the equilibrium price and quantity of the domestic input when
the price elasticity of demand for the final product is less (in absolute
value) than the critical value(1 —y)/(5*—'y').Formoderate price elas-
ticities of demand for the final product, this condition can be violated only
when a very stringent content requirement forces a substantial divergence
between and 1. Hence, over a fairly broad range, it is reasonable to
expect that increases in the required share of domestic content will provide
increased protection to suppliers of the domestic input.
5. Differences between 1mestic and Foreign Producers
In some situations where content protection is used or contemplated, such
as the 3. S. auto industry, domestic firms typically use a much higher ratio
of domestic to imported input than foreign firms who export to the domestic
market. Th deal with this case, it is convenient to assume that foreign firms
use both domestic and imported (or foreign) inputs to produce their output
X, in accord with the production technology described in section 2, while20
domestic firms produce their output, Y, using a only fixed amount, b, of
domestic input per unit of output. ()itputs of domestic and foreign firms are
assumed to be good but imperfect substitutes. The demand for foreign output
is X = H(P, R), where P is the absolute price of the foreign product and
R is the absolute price of the domestic product, w = (P/H) ( /aP) < 0 is
the elasticity of demand for the foreign product with respect to its own
price, and = (R/H) .( d/) > 0 is the elasticity of demand for the foreign
product with respect to the absolute price of the domestic product. The
demand for domestic output is Y = N(R, P), where V = (R/N) 'C N/) < 0 is
the elasticity of demand for the domestic product with respect to its own
price, and i=(P/N) 'C /3P) > 0 is the elasticity of demand for domestic
product with respect to the price of the foreign product. Imported (or
foreign) input is assumed to be in infinitely elastic supply at a given value
of its absolute price, V. Supply of the domestic input is S(TJ), with an
elasticity ofC = (tJ/S(U))s'(u) > 0.
Given these assumptions, the derived demand for the domestic input may be
expressed as
D = (d/f(d)) H(P, R) + b'N(R, P)1 (27)
where d is the ratio of domestic to imported input used by foreignpro-
ducers, P = (Ud/f(d)) + (V/f(d)), and R = bU. The general expression for
the proportional change in the derived demand for the domestic input is
cz•{(1 -i)d+w.p+ yR] + (1 -cz)•[v'R÷•pj , (28)
wherecz = (d/f(d)) .[.j(p, R)/D is the fraction of total demand for domestic
input accounted for by foreign firms; where, as before, I = d'f'(d)/f(d);
and where21
P= (6- 1)'d÷6ri+(1- (29)
R=U . (30)
Using these results and (19), we may derive the expression for the propor-
tionate change in the derived demand for the domestic input (at constant
values of(3 and V) in response to a proportionate change in the domestic
content requirement;
D =(1/(1-6*)).{a•(i -1)+(6*-y)[aw+(1-a)•]}.* (31)
It follows that the condition for an increase in the domestic content
requirement to increase demand for the domestic input is
—[(1—a).ji/aJ <((1—y)/(6*—1)1 (32)
Since the right hand side of (32), which is identical to the right hand
side of (24), has a value of infinity when6* =1,it follows that impo-
sitionof a marginally effective content requirement for foreign firms
necessarily increases demand for the domestic input. Asthecontent require-
ment rises above the marginally effective level, further increases in6*
diminish foreign firms demand for domestic input by raising the price and
decreasing the demand for the output of these firms. This effect is captured
by the term Iwlonthe right hand side of (32). This effect, however, is at
least partially offset by the increased demand of domestic firms for domestic
input resulting from the shift of final product demand toward domestic firms
due to the increased price of the output of foreign firms. This effect is
captured by the term —(1—a)•i/a on the right hand side of (32). It
follows that if the reduction in demand for the foreign firms' product due to
a price increase is largely a shift of demand toward the product of domestic22
firms (which use a higher ratio of domestic input than foreign firms), then an
increase in the required share of domestic content for foreign firms is likely
to increase demand for the domestic input and hence benefit suppliers of this
input. Suppliers of the domestic input can lose at the margin from an
increase in the domestic content requirement only when the required share of
domestic content already significantly exceeds the share foreign firms would
voluntarily choose and when an increase in the price of the foreign firms'
product significantly diminishes total demand for the product of foreign and
domestic firms.
6. Non-Competitive Behavior
Returning to the simpler case where all firms produce the same product
using the same technology, it is interesting to consider the effects of
content protection when markets for the final product or the domestic input
are not competitive. We continue with the assumption that the imported input
is competitively supplied at a constant absolute price.
Only minor modifications of the preceding analysis are required to deal
with monopoly power in the final product market, if this power was already
being exercised prior to the introduction of content protection. For a given
demand function, X =H(P),there is a marginal revenue function, X =
J(M),which expresses the relationship between output sold, X, and the
monopolist's marginal revenue,i.8 The monopolist equates marginal revenue to
unit production cost, implying that derived demand for the domestic input is
determined by
D =(d/f(d))J[(U'd/f(d)) +(v/f(d))] . (33)23
This derived demand relationship is identical to the derived demand rela-
tionship (10) for the competitive case, except that the marginal revenue
function J has replaced the demand function H. All results for the
competitive case, with both free input choice and with content protection,
remain valid, provided that the elasticity of demand for the final product,
fl =(P/H(P))H'(P); is everywhere replaced by the elasticity of the marginal
revenue function, =(M/J(M))J'(M).
Of course, a monopolist will generally sell a smaller amount of final
product and use a smaller amount of domestic input than would be the case
under competition. Introduction of content protection, however, need not
affect these differences between monopoly and competition in the final product
market because content protection directly affects the cost conditions of
final goods producers, not the conditions of demand for their output.
Monopsony in the domestic input market can be handled in much the same
way as monopoly in the final product market. The supply function for the
domestic input, S(U), implies a marginal factor cost function, Q(W), which
specifies the relationship between the quantity of this input and its marginal
cost, W, for a purchaser who recognizes that supply price rises with the
number of units purchased. The analysis of section 4 goes through, when the
price of domestic input, U, is everywhere replaced by its marginal factor
cost, W, and when the elasticity of the supply function, C= (tJ/S(U)) (U)
is everywhere replaced by the the elasticity of the marginal factor cost
function,A =(W/Q(w))Q' (W) •Aswith the case of monopoly in the final
product market, monopsony in the domestic input market will generally reduce
the equilibrium price and quantity of the domestic input to below the levels
that would prevail under competition. However, since content protection does
not directly affect the conditions of supply of the domestic input, it need24
not affect, in an important way, these differences between the monopsonistic
and the competitive equilibrium in the market for the domestic input.
Content protection interacts in an important way with monopoly in the
final product market and monopsony in the domestic input market if it creates
monopoly and monopsony power in these markets when it would not otherwise have
existed. This might happen, for example, if a single domestic firm which used
a high ratio of domestic to imported input originally competed with foreign
firms that found it efficient to use lower ratios of domestic to imported
input. A content protection requirement that forced the foreign firms to use
much higher ratios of domestic input to imported input than they would
otherwise choose might remove these firms as competitors both in the market
for the final product and in the market for the domestic input, thereby
allowing the domestic firm to exercise both monopoly power in the final
product market and monopsony power in the market for the domestic input.
Exercise of monopoly power by suppliers of the domestic input against
demanders of this input is almost always affected by content protection
because content protection directly affects the elasticity as well as the
level of derived demand for the domestic input, as illustrated in figures 4
and 5. In these figures, the curve labeled D(U) shows the derived demand
for the domestic input when producers exercise free choice of input
combinatori. The curve labeled D*(U) shows the derived demand for domestic
input when the content requirement )&is imposed. It is assumed that
this content requirement is only marginally effective, in the sense that
is equal to the share of domestic input that producers voluntarily choose in
the equilibrium that prevails before content protection, with suppliers of the
domestic input optimally exploiting their monopoly power. In figure 4, it is











Fig.--4. Marginally Effective Content Protection When the Supplier of





Fig.—-5. Marginally Effective Content Protection When the Supplier of






inputs, a,is greater than one in absolute value. This implies that the
share of the domestic input grows as we move down along the D(U) curve.
The D*(U) curve therefore corresponds to the D(U) curve below the initial
equilibrium price and lies to the right of this demand curve above the initial
equilibrium price. In contrast, in figure 5, it is assumed that id
is <1.This implies that the share of domestic input declines as we move
down along the D(U) curve. The D*(U) curve therefore corresponds to the
D(TJ) curve above the initial equilibrium price, and lies to the right of this
demand curve below the initial equilibrium price. Constructing the marginal
revenue curves that are appropriate with and without marginally effective
content protection, it is apparent from figure 4 that whenJ a >1,
marginally effective content protection raises the monopoly price and lowers
the monopoly quantity of the domestic input.In contrast, as illustrated in
figure 5, whendis<1,marginally effective content protection lowers
the monopoly price and raises the monopoly quantity of the domestic input.9
1spite the differences in the direction of change in the monopoly equi-
librium price and quantity of the domestic input, depending on the elasticity
of substitution, the monopolistic supplier of the domestic input always gains
from the introduction of marginally effective content protection. The
monopolist clearly cannot lose because the initial monopoly equilibrium point
remains available. The monopolist actually gains from marginally effective
content protection by moving away from this initial equilibrium point in
whichever direction allows him to take advantage of marginally effective
content protection. Increases in the domestic content requirement above the
marginally effective level are clearly beneficial to the monopolistic supplier
of the domestic input so long as they increase the demand for this input at
the price that the monopolist is already charging.28
7. Conclusions andExtensions
The main conclusions of the preceding analysis may be summarized as
follows. First, content protection creates a production distortion by forcing
an inefficient choice of domestic and imported (or foreign) inputs, but it
does not create an excess consumption distortion by forcing a divergence
between social production cost (given the inefficiency in input choice) and
output price. Second, content protection biases investments in improvements
in technical efficiency away from improvements that save domestic input and
toward improvements that save imported (or foreign) input. Third, under
competitive conditions, introduction of a marginally effective content
requirement increases demand for the domestic input and benefits suppliers of
this input. Fourth, increases in the domestic content requirement above the
marginally effective level further increase demand for the domestic input and
further benefit suppliers of this input provided that the price elasticity of
demand for the final product is smaller (in absolute value) than a critical
value that varies inversely with the stringency of the content requirement.
Fifth, the consequences of monopoly in the final product market andmonopsony
in the domestic input market are not materially affected by content protection
unless such a policy creates a monopoly or monopsony situation when one would
not otherwise have existed. Sixth, content protection does in general enhance
the monopoly power of suppliers of the domestic input.
Among these conclusions, those that deal with effects on the suppliers of
domestic inputs are sensitive to the assumption of a single domestic input and
hence a unity of interests among the suppliers of this input. Suppose instead
that the domestic input D is produced by t more basic inputs, L and
K, in accord with a neo—classical, linear homogeneous production function,29
ID=G(LD,1(D). Suppose further that these t inputs are mobile between
industries, are fixed in aggregate supply, and are used in the rieo—classical,
linear homogeneous production function Z =H(L, to produce the
economy's other genic output,Z, whose absolute price is denoted by T.
Under these assumptions, the economy may be thought of as producing two
products, D and Z, with absolute prices U and T, using the technology
of the standard, Hechscher—Ohlin—Samuelson model.° Content protection which
increases the demand for D at given values of all prices will increase the
equilibrium relative product price U/T. Hence, the combination of L and
K used in D (which earns U for each unit of D produced) will gain
relative to the combination of L and K used in Z(which earns T per
unit of Z produced). When we look at individual factors, however, the
Stolper—Samuelsontheorem tells us that thereward to the factor used inten-
sively inD will rise relative to U and T, while the reward to the other
factor declines in terms of both products. With this production structure,
therefore, it is the factor used intensively in D that is the beneficiary of
content protection.
Modifying the assumptions of the preceding paragraph, suppose that only
the factor L is mobile between IDand Z and that K is specific to the
industry where it is employed. The production structure for D and Z is
now described by the specific capital or Viner—Ricardo model.11 Content
protection which raises the demand forID at given prices will, as in
Heckscher—Ohlin—Samuelson structure of the preceding paragraph, increase the
equilibrium relative product price U/T. The combination of L and K used
inID will gain relative to the combination of L and K used in Z. With
respect to individual factors, the reward to KID will rise relative to U
and T, the reward to mobile L will rise relative to T but fall relative30
to U, and the reward to i will fall relative to T and U. Thus, K
specific to D will be the clear winner from content protection, with K
specific to Z the clear loser, and mobile L somewhere in between.
Modifying further the technology for production of X to allow for
different substitution relations between imported inputs and particular
domestic inputs, the production function XF(I, D) might he written as
x =J(I,LD, 1(D). With this technology for X production, the effect of
content protection on demands for LD and KD at given prices depends on the
nature and strength of complementarity and substitution relations among the
factors cooperating to produce X. If, for example, LD was a strong cornple—
rnent for I IL >0)while 1(D was a strong substitute for I and L (J11(
< 0 and LK < 0), then content protection might increase demand for
while reducing demand for L0. Equilibrium effects on rewards to individual
domestic factors would depend additionally on the specificity or mobility of
LD and KD and the intensity with which these factors are used in other
domestic production activities. Rather than enumerating the possible out-
comes, suffice it to emphasize that the gains and losses of individual
domestic factors from content protection depend on the details of the
production structure of the economy.
Finally, it is important to note two assumptions of the preceding
analysis that are not always satisfied when content protection is an active
issue. First, foreign firms induced to establish domestic production facil-
ities because of content protection may not pay the same price or face the
same conditions in the market for domestic factors as domestic firms in their
industry. In developing countries, foreign firms typically pay higher wage
rates than domestic firms. It is argued that these higher wage rates attract
a queue of unemployed workers who wait for a high wage job at a foreign firm
rather than accepting a lower wage job at a domestic firm.If so, then31
content protection that increases the number of high wage jobs at foreign
firms may have a significant efficiency cost in terms of higher unem-
ployment. For the U.S. auto industry, this situation is probably reversed:
the effect of content protection on automobile prices, on wages of auto
workers and on profits of U.S. auto firms depends on whether foreign firms
induced to locate production facilities in the U.S. accept the high wage rates
and work rules currently prevailing at U.S. firms. Second, constant returns
to scale is not an accurate assumption for automobile industries in developing
countries that have frequently been subjects of content protection and may not
be an accurate assumption for other industries in these countries or for
industries in developed countries that are actual or potential subjects of
such policies. Reasonable efficiency in final assembly and in manufacture of
some automobile parts and components may be achievable at a scale commensurate
with final sales (and desirable product diversity) in the markets of the
largest developing countries. Efficient manufacture of some automobile
components (with allowance for desirable product diversity), however,
apparently requires a scale achieved only in the largest automobile markets
(North America, Europe, and Japan).12 Stringent domestic content requirements
that force small scale production of these automobile components necessarily
have significant efficiency costs beyond the increase in unit production cost
indicated by the analysis in section 2. The same point applies to content
requirements in other industries where scale economies remain important for
some components of the final product at scales beyond the size of the domestic
market. Moreover, when scale economies are important, there is the danger
that content protection will artificially create a "natural monopoly" in which
a single, efficient domestic producer keeps out domestic rivals (who cannot
reach efficient scale) and is freed of competition from foreign firms who do
not meet the content requirement.32
Footnotes
1. The United States, for example, permits foreign assembled products
normally subject to tariffs or other import restraints to enter the U.S. with
reduced duties if they embody a minimum specified value of U.S. produced
components.
2. analyses of content protection schemes are also provided by Corden (1971,
pp. 45—50), by Johnson (1972, pp. 285—306) for the case of the Canadian auto
industry before the Canada—U.S. auto pact, and by 4unk (1969) for automobile
industries in several Latin American countries.
3. Grossman (1981) writes the production function as X =F(L,M +M*)
where L is a domestic primary input called labor" arid M and M* are
domestic and imported material inputs that are perfect substitutes in
producing the final product. Grossman specifies that a physical content
requirement sets a maximum ratio of M* to M and that a value (or share)
content requirement sets a maximum value of P M/P X where P is the price
of the iinjorted material input and P is the output price. While this
formulation may be reasonable for some industries subject to content protec-
tion, I would argue that the production function (1) which allows a more
flexible representation of substitution possibilities between domestic and
imported inputs is more appropriate for a general analysis of content
protection. Moreover, in most domestic content schemes, the cost of primary
domestic inputs, as well as purchased domestic material inputs or components,
is allowable in the calculation of domestic content. The present analysis of
content protection is consistent with this practice rather than with
Grossman's assumption that only domestic material inputs count as domestic
content.33
4. ThOprotectdomestic firms whose costs are raised by the content require-
ment from foreign firms that produce entirely abroad it will generally be
necessary either to prohibit imports of foreign goods that fail to meet the
content requirement or charge a suitable tariff on such goods. In some cases,
protective tariffs on the final product may already be in force before content
protection is introduced. Then, as Corden (1971) notes, introduction of
content protection will reduce effective protection for domestic producers of
the final product by raising the price they must pay for purchased domestic
inputs.
5.In his analysis of the content protection scheme for the Canadian auto
industry, Johnson (1972) concludes, "The content requirement, when effective,
forces the manufacturer to spend the increased profit he would obtain [from
remission of duties on imported inputs], not on lower prices to the consumer,
but on the excess cost of parts production in Canada." This conclusion is
only partially correct. Some fraction of the remitted penalty tariff is
effectively absorbed by the increase in unit production cost for firms that
satisfy the domestic content requirement. However, provided that competition
prevails, the part of the remitted penalty tariff that is not absorbed by this
increased cost is passed through to purchasers of the final product.
6. There is some consumption distortion loss from content protection because
the price to consumers is raised above the price that would prevail in the
absence of such protection. There is not, however, any excess consumption
distortion loss from content protection due to a divergence between true
social domestic production cost and the price charged to consumers.
7. This result differs from Grossman's conclusions (see his propositions 3
and 5) that a "small" (marginally effective) content requirement could raise
or lower domestic value added. The reason for the difference is in Grossman's34
specification of technology arid in his definition of the magnitude to which
the domestic content requirement is applied. Specifically, Grossman includes
only domestic material inputs in his definition domestic content that sat-
isfies the content requirement. A marginally effective content requirement in
his model increases the quantity of the domestic material input, but may
reduce value added from the primary domestic input sufficiently to reduce
total domestic value added.
8. For the purpose of this discussion, it is assumed that marginal revenue,
M, is a well—defined, monotonically decreasing function of output, X.
9. Grossman (proposition 6) concludes that imposition of a marginally
effective content requirement will always induce a monopolistic supplier of
the domestic material input to raise his price and reduce his quantity. This
is because in Grossman's model the demand curve facing the supplier of the
domestic material input is infinitely elastic at the world market price of the
imported input before content protection is imposed. When a marginally
effective domestic content requirement is imposed, the demand curve facing the
domestic supplier of the material input has finite elasticity at and in a
region to the left of the old equilibrium point without this requirement. kt
the old equilibrium, therefore, marginal revenue must he less than marginal
cost when the marginally effective content requirement is imposed, implying
that the monopolistic supplier of the domestic material input will increase
hispriceand reduce his quantity.
10. see Jones (1965) for a clear discussion and summary of the properties of
this model.
11. See Jones (1971), Mayer (1974) or Mussa (1974) for an exposition of the
essential properties of the model.35
12. Munk (1969) cites evidence from the 1950's and 1960's that indicates
differing degrees of scale economies for different processes in automobile
manufacturing, with some meaningful economies for total vehicle production
remaining at a scale of three or four hundred thousand vehicles per year. The
shift toward production of "world cars" by leading manufacturers suggests that
scale economies in automobiles today are at least as important as they were a
decade or two decades ago.36
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